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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH l/4.;v..i.j..l B'v ... f 
ROSS WANGSGARD, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
PEGGY FITZPATRICK, WILLIAM 
LENCE, THOMAS R. MATHEWS, 
and BONNIE J. MATHEWS, his 
wife, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
CASE 
No. 
n«90 
APPi:M,<vcv! •; j ,-,- .^p_ni A R i Nf; 
Petition for Re-hearing from the Judgment 
of the Utah Supreme Court 
Entered on November 3, 197 5 
JAMES A. MCINTOSH 
MCINTOSH & ROBERTSON 
525 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAMES N. BARBER 
455 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondents F I L E D 
-07 *•' $"\9J' 
Cldfk. Supremo Coiaf* 0JMB *egn 
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PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
POINT 1. THE MAJORITY OPINION'S STATEMENT THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF "TRANSFERRED HIS ENTIRE INTEREST 
IN THE DEMISED PREMISES TO RYAN FOR THE UN-
EXPIRED BALANCE OF THE TERM," IS ERRONEOUS 
AND IN FACT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE 1 
CONCLUSION 
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POINT 1 
THE MAJORITY OPINIONfS STATEMENT THAT THE PLAINTIFF 
"TRANSFERRED HIS ENTIRE INTEREST IN THE DEMISED PREMISES TO 
RYAN FOR THE UNEXPIRED BALANCE OF THE TERM." IS ERRONEOUS 
AND IN FACT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE• 
1. Since this appeal involves a granting of a Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Supreme Court is obliged to inter-
pret the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
The cases hold that a party against whom a Motion for Summary 
Judgment is made is entitled to have the reviewing Court inter-
pret the evidence in a light most favorable to the said party. 
Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 U. 289, 59 P. 2d 297, 298 (1953); 
Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 16 U. 2d 81, 395 P. 2d 918 (1964). 
2. The plaintiff's own testimony clearly shows that 
he did not transfer his "entire interest" in the demised pre-
mises to Ryan. The official transcript of testimony of the 
trial shows: 
(1) Plaintiff had $5,000 worth of his own 
recreational amusement machines on the 
premises at all times after the sale of the 
"bar equipment" to Ryan [R. 141, 252]. He 
was earning a profit of $5,000 annually 
from these machines both before and after 
the sale. [R. 141] These amusement items 
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were in addition to the "bar equipment" 
he sold to Ryan. [R. 141, 144-146, 252] 
The seventh paragraph of the majority opinion 
assumes that the plaintiff's only interest 
in the items on the demised premises was a 
"security" interest in the bar equipment 
which the plaintiff sold to Ryan. The Court 
concludes that this security interest did 
not constitute a partial possession of the 
premises. However, plaintiff testified that 
he owned amusement items worth $5,000 and com-
prised of cigarette machines, pinball machines, 
juke boxes, etc.; that these items were also 
on the premises and that these items constituted 
a partial possession of the premises. The 
Court's decision ignores these other items. 
(2) The plaintiff did not testify as stated 
in the majority opinion that he "transferred 
his entire interest in the demised premises 
to Ryan for the unexpired balance of the term." 
On the contrary, the plaintiff testified he 
did not assign his leasehold interest to 
Ryan for the following reasons: 
(a) The real property lease documents 
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gave the plaintiff the first option to pur-
chase the premises which he considered a 
valuable property right* [R. 193- 194; Ex. 
6-P, 118] 
(b) The sale of the business 
was tentative only and it would not be 
formalized in writing for two to six months 
and until Marvin Ryan could get in a 
sound financial position; therefore, the 
plaintiff wanted to wait and see how 
Ryan did. If he did poorly, and the plain-
tiff had to take back the business, he did 
not want to have to renegotiate his business 
on the real property lease with the owners 
of the building. [R. 178, 181] 
(c) The plaintiff had his own 
recreational and amusement items worth 
$5,000 on part of the leased premises which 
satisfied paragraph seventeen (17) of the 
real property lease for a holdover status 
of the leased premises "or any part thereof." 
[R. 141, 144-146, 252] . 
(d) The plaintiff retained title to 
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all of the other property on the premises 
which he was selling to Marvin Ryan. [R. 
177] The evidence of trial clearly shows 
that Marvin Ryan abandoned the premises 
approximately twelve (12) days before the 
locks were changed by the new owners of the 
building. During this twelve day period, 
the only person owning the property both 
bar equipment and amusement items would 
be the plaintiff herein. This is so because 
Ryan had defaulted on the purchase of the 
"bar equipment" when he abandoned the pre-
mises and because he had not made the 
monthly payments prior to that time. 
At the trial, the question was asked of the plaintiff: "Did 
you ever assign the interest that you had in the lease, in-
sofar as the use and occupancy of the premises was concerned, 
to Mr. Ryan or anyone else?" The plaintiffs answer was: "No.1 
[R. 181, lines 6-9] The plaintiff was further asked the ques-
tion: "Why is it you didn't assign the lease-interest to him 
[Ryan]?" The plaintiff stated the reason he did not assign 
the lease interest to Ryan was because the plaintiff had his 
amusement machines and recreational equipment on the premises 
and was therefore occupying and using part of the premises. 
4 
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He further stated, that in the event Ryan did not realize 
any profit from the purchase of the bar equipment during 
the first few months, and the plaintiff had to repossess 
the bar equipment, then there would be fewer legal problems 
for the plaintiff in taking over the operation and business 
and continuing it; if he retained his interest in the lease. 
[R. 181, lines 18-29] 
On cross-examination by Mr, Barber, the plaintiff 
reaffirms the fact that he had not transferred his interest 
in the premises to Mr. Ryan. Mr. Barber asked the question: 
"It is a matter of fact, isn't it, that after February 1, 
1973, as a business man you had nothing to do with the 
premises located at 368 South Main, Park City?" To this 
question, the plaintiff answered: "No, sir. That is not a 
fact." [R. 233] The plaintiff then went on to te]J. Mr. 
Barber what interest he had in the premises. 
The plaintiff further stated that after the sale to 
Ryan, he was on the premises two to three times a week for 
the purpose of servicing his own amusement items as well as 
to insure that the "bar equipment" which he sold to Ryan was 
not being depleted or wasted. [R. 182] 
Finally, Mr. Wangsgard stated that when Mrs. Fitz-
patrick contacted him on behalf of the new owners and told 
him that he would have to get his equipment out of the prem-
ises; and when the plaintiff asked her why she was contacting 
him, she stated that she recognized that he was the tenant of 
record on the lease and he was the person who the new owners 
would have to deal with. [R# 192, 194, 245] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The plaintiff submits that the majority opinion cannot 
point to any line or page in the official record or transcript 
of the trial proceedings which states either directly or 
indirectly that the plaintiff transferred his interest in the 
lease to Ryan the purchaser. None of the witnesses testified 
to that affect. However, notwithstanding this overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary, the majority opinion says: "Here 
plaintiff transferred his entire interest in the demised 
premises to Ryan, for the unexpired balance of his term;" and 
therefore plaintiff was not a sublessee. The opinion also 
says in the fifth (5th) paragraph in part as follows: "This 
plaintiff could not do, for he had transferred whatever poss-
essory interest he had to Ryan, at the time of plaintiff's 
sale to Ryan. At the time of the sale, plaintiff had only a 
month-to-month tenancy and this condition committed to Ryan, 
retaining only a right of re-entry for commission broken." 
The plaintiff submits this language is a mere gratuity not 
supported by one shred of evidence in the official transcript. 
Since the majority opinion is based on the false premise 
about plaintiff having transferred his entire interest in the 
demised premises to Ryan, the opinion should be amended to 
set forth the correct facts; and, based on these correct 
facts, to reach a different result in favor of the plaintiff 
herein. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff re-
spectfully submits that he is entitled to a re-hearing on the 
issues presented in his original brief; and the plaintiff 
respectfully requests the opportunity to have an oral argument 
pertaining to these issues, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
v 
MCINTOSH & ROBERTSON 
t?M^ a M -
IES A. MCINTOSH 
torneys for Appellant 
525 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I delivered two copies of the Petition 
for Re-Hearing to James N. Barber, 455 South 300 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this 24th day of November, 1975. 
MCINTOSH & ROBERTSON 
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